Deconstructing CELIOS's Logic on the 2026 State Budget

The publication by the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS) on September 8, 2026, which urged the Constitutional Court (MK) to annul the 2026 State Budget Law, presents an alarming narrative. By pitting the narrative of a 75.62% budget cut for the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) against food poisoning incidents in the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, CELIOS has shifted from a macroeconomic research entity into a partisan advocacy group.

A critical analysis of the release reveals comparative logical fallacies (apples-to-oranges), a misrepresentation of fiscal instrument structures, and a disregard for constitutional facts. Below is a breakdown of these claims, supported by legal instruments and materialized data.

1. The Illusion of Disaster Budget "Cuts" and the Facts of the On-Call Fund (DSP)

The claim that the state is neglecting escalating disasters because the BNPB's routine Budget Execution Document (DIPA) is only IDR 491 billion is a manipulation in reading the State Budget (APBN) posture. Disaster mitigation budgets in Indonesia have never been pegged solely to the operational DIPA of a single agency.

  • Regulatory Fact: Based on Law No. 24 of 2007 concerning Disaster Management (Article 69), as well as Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) No. 224/PMK.05/2015, the government manages the Dana Siap Pakai (DSP) or On-Call Fund mechanism.
  • Fiscal Context: This emergency fund is centralized in the State General Treasurer (BUN) account at the Ministry of Finance. When an emergency response status is declared by a regional head or the president, BNPB has full authorization to withdraw unlimited funds (amounting to trillions of rupiah) from the BUN for evacuation and logistical needs. A decrease in BNPB's routine budget generally reflects the efficiency of bureaucratic spending (personnel/official travel expenses), not a paralysis of the state's disaster response capabilities.

2. Cross-Sectoral Forest and Land Fire (Karhutla) Management, Not BNPB's Sole Burden

CELIOS states that the IDR 491 billion budget is only equivalent to 0.4% of the estimated losses from Forest and Land Fires (Karhutla) (IDR 123.1 trillion). This is a comparative fallacy that pits macroeconomic/ecological impact valuations against the operational costs of a single administrative agency.

  • Regulatory Fact: In accordance with the mandate of Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 3 of 2020 concerning Forest and Land Fire Management, Karhutla management is executed collaboratively by 28 Ministries/Agencies, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), and Regional Governments.
  • Fiscal Context: If one wishes to calculate total disaster mitigation expenditures, the budget posts must be accumulated. There are trillions of rupiah distributed across the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) for Manggala Agni operations, the Peatland and Mangrove Restoration Agency (BRGM) for structural ecosystem interventions, public kitchen logistics budgets in the Ministry of Social Affairs, up to the deployment funds for BKO (Under Operational Control) troops in TNI and Polri institutions. Omitting this cross-sectoral allocation data is a misrepresentation of public policy analysis.

3. The Statistical Scale of MBG and the Misplaced Burden of Failure

CELIOS exploits the incident of 50,000 suspected food poisoning cases in the MBG program (a loss of IDR 40.38 billion) as a basis for fiscal failure. It is undeniable that public health incidents are serious matters requiring strict audits; however, presenting them as grounds to annul the State Budget is a premature leap to conclusions.

  • Program Scale Fact: The MBG program is a massive logistical decentralization targeting tens of millions of school children and pregnant women every day. If the beneficiaries reach an equivalent of 80 million people per day, a cumulative incident of 50,000 people falls into a very small incidence ratio (under 0.1%).
  • Regulatory Context: Mass poisoning cases in this decentralized program are issues of quality control standardization and local supply chain supervision, not macroeconomic design failures. The resolution lies within the enforcement of Law No. 18 of 2012 concerning Food and the intervention of the Food and Drug Supervisory Agency (BPOM) to discipline public kitchen vendors, not by destroying the social protection budget posture in the State Budget. Halting this program is tantamount to depriving tens of millions of other beneficiaries of their right to nutrition.

4. The Politicization Maneuver of Judicial Review at the Constitutional Court

CELIOS's push for the Constitutional Court to immediately hear Case No. 100/PUU-XXIV/2026 before the fiscal year ends exposes the institution's primary motive: using legal instruments to pressure executive policy.

  • Constitutional Fact: According to Article 23 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, the State Budget is established by law. In the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence, the design of the State Budget posture is absolutely recognized as an Open Legal Policy belonging to the lawmakers (the Government and the House of Representatives/DPR).
  • Legal Context: The Constitutional Court does not have the constitutional authority to evaluate allocation priorities (e.g., why program A receives more than program B), unless the allocation violates mandatory spending explicitly regulated in the Constitution (such as 20% for education). The MBG program is, in fact, a manifestation of Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution regarding the care of the impoverished and the development of a social security system. Filing a judicial review due to a disagreement over technical allocations is a form of politicizing the judicial system.